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Therapeutic CPR or Consent DNR—A Dilemma
Looking for an Answer
KENNETH PLUNKITT, MD, FADI MATAR, MD, LOFTY BASTA, MD, FACC, FACP, FRCP
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Mr. JW was 76 when he died. Six months earlier, I had a long
talk with him and his wife when he was leaving the hospital
after three weeks on a ventilator for the treatment of pneu-
monia.
Doctor: As you know, you have severe emphysema and you
will need to be on oxygen around the clock.
JW: Yes, I know that. I am hardly able to move. I can’t
finish a sentence without getting short of breath.
Doctor: You must stop smoking.
JW: I cannot and I will not. This is the only source of joy
for me now. I know it is killing me. But I want you to
know that I do not want to be placed on the ventilator
again. Next time, please let me go in peace.
Doctor: After all it is your choice. I promise to follow your
directive. (His wife nods as if to say “I agree”.)
Four months later, Mr. JW’s wife brought him to the
emergency room with chest pain. He was drenched in sweat
and suffocating:
Doctor: Do you want me to place you on a ventilator to
breathe for you?
JW: Nods, and wife screams “He is dying, do something!”
JW was placed on a full assist ventilation. He had an
anterior MI, severe left ventricular systolic dysfunction, anuria,
intramural thrombus and an embolic stroke. Despite artificial
dialysis and multiple team intensive care, JW died from
multiple organ failure and systemic infection six weeks later.
Another patient:
Mr. GH, a 67 year-old homeless person, developed out-of-
hospital cardiac arrest. He received bystander cardiopulmonary
resuscitation (CPR). In the intensive care unit, he was sustained
on the ventilator, developed renal failure requiring dialysis,
ARDS, peripheral gangrene requiring toe and finger amputa-
tion and systemic infection. He never recovered consciousness,
and a Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) order was contemplated two
weeks later. An eligible relative (nephew) was found in another
state after a few days of searching (otherwise a court appointed
guardian would have been needed). The nephew’s instructions
were “continue to do everything possible.” He did not give
DNR consent. Mr. GH died four weeks later in intensive care.
These two cases represent everyday occurrences in the
practice of cardiology and intensive care. Do these cases
represent the exercise of patients’ autonomy in the choice of
resuscitation? Did they serve the patients’ best interests? In the
first case, was a dying patient’s cry for help a plea for
resuscitation or relief? In the second case, was the relative’s
choice a true representation of the patient’s own choice
assuming that he could be fully informed, able to comprehend
and had the leisure to make an uncoerced choice?
Cardiopulmonary resuscitation by necessity is undertaken
under unusual circumstances. A large percentage of patients
who at one time expressed a desire for DNR change their
minds when facing the imminence of death (1). One wonders
whether this change is based on rational reevaluation of
circumstances or is simply reflective of the gravity of the
situation. Also, surrogate decisions are often discordant with
the patients’ own wishes, tainted with feelings of guilt, fear of
loss of a loved one, concern about possible future accusations
that they didn’t show enough concern, or motivated by self gain
(2,3).
The common practice of “do everything possible” by which
interventions are undertaken with no clear health benefit to
the patient is neither rational nor humane. The open salad-
bar-eat-all-you-can approach to medical care of the dying is
wasteful and cannot be sustained. Patients’ families often ask
for “do everything possible” out of convenience, and because
there are no economic consequences to them.
For physicians, the same attitude safeguards against possi-
ble litigation, and in many instances, is rewarding financially. In
addition, it satisfies a physician’s passion for high-tech inter-
ventions.
Furthermore, for the minority of Americans who execute
Advance Directives, the patient’s true wishes about medical
care in terminal illness are often neglected, overlooked, over-
ruled, renegotiated or re-interpreted (2,4,5). Such behavior
from physicians and the public undermines the patient’s au-
tonomy and complicates an already vexing problem.
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Is there a solution to this wasteful, high-technology driven
death-denying attitude toward terminal care? Cardiopulmo-
nary resuscitation (CPR) is a medical intervention that must
have its indications and therapeutic goal. In our view, it must
not be applied unless there is a reasonable hope for a conscious
life with a chance that the patient will be able to pursue and
achieve some degree of happiness. The prevailing policy of
consent DNR (6,7), i.e., resuscitate every patient unless he is
clearly terminal in extremis and death is imminent, and
provided the patient or surrogate agree to DNR, needs further
review. We argue that like other medical treatments, CPR
should be the domain of the treating professionals.
Two questions have to be addressed: First, would such
policy undermine the patient’s autonomy? Second: Does it give
undue power to physicians?
According to the American Constitution, the individual has
supreme authority over his body (8). Therefore, any policy that
undermines such authority is, unconstitutional. It follows that
life and death decisions should be left in the hands of
individual or his appointed proxy. On the other hand, the
exercise of autonomy requires full information, capacity to
evaluate and choose and ability to make a free spontaneous
decision. Clearly, these conditions cannot be satisfied in the
emergency room or intensive care unit. Furthermore, credible
studies have shown that after patient’s death, a large percent-
age of families report that their loved ones were not treated
according to the patient’s expressed wishes (4), and others
regret what they allowed their loved ones to endure (9). In
addition, the current restrictive policies of DNR fly in the face
of the fact that most fully informed seniors do not wish to
undergo resuscitation in the event of cardiopulmonary arrest
(10,11) when the odds are overwhelmingly against a successful
outcome and when the expected survival to discharge is less
than 5%.
The slippery slope argument that by relinquishing so much
authority to physicians over matters of life and death could
lead to abuse should not be a reason to suffocate a sensible
discussion of this vital subject. Physicians are trained to deal
with disease and death issues. Like an informed jury that
adjudicates life or death in criminal cases, the treating physi-
cians and nurses are suited to evaluate which patients are
suitable for CPR based on the patient’s functional status and
prognosis.
To guard against possible misapplication and to protect
against litigation, we propose that national guidelines for CPR
be developed. Already many authors have proposed such
guidelines (12,13). These guidelines will need to be reviewed
and refined by a consortium of medical establishment includ-
ing the AHA, ACC, AMA and Association of Medical Speci-
alities among others. Furthermore, health care professionals
and the public at large should be better educated about the
possible outcomes of CPR under various medical scenarios.
The literature indicates that both the lay public and health
professionals have unrealistic expectations for resuscitation
(14,15).
We believe that guidelines for DNR orders recently artic-
ulated by the American Heart Association are extremely
restrictive (16). They provide an impediment to the use of
DNR orders rather than allow for the rational application of
CPR. For example, they call for CPR in cases of permanent
vegetative state when high brain functions are irretrievably
lost. No counterargument is more eloquent than that of
Mitchell et al., who in a recent review of vegetative states asked
the following rhetorical question: “Why do we persist in the
relentless pursuit of . . . treatments to maintain unconscious
existence? Will they be treated because of our ethical commit-
ment to their humanity, or because of an ethical paralysis in
the face of biotechnical progress?” (17) Also, the AHA
recommends that CPR be withheld only when there is absolute
certainty about the patient’s imminent death.
Rational CPR indications should not be required to pass
the “absolute certainty” standard advocated by the AHA. As in
all human endeavors, the “beyond reasonable doubt standard”
applied in legal pursuits should be the guiding standard, and
the patient’s best interests should be the ultimate arbiter.
It seems fitting to quote Massachusetts Court proceedings
from 1978. In the case of Shirley Dinnerstein, the family of an
older patient suffering from advanced cerebrovascular and
cardiovascular disease requested DNR for their patient:
“Attempts to apply resuscitation for Mrs. Dinnerstein will do
nothing to cure or relieve the illness which have brought the
patient to the threshold of death—this case presents a question
peculiarly within the competence of the medical profession of
what measures are appropriate to ease the passing of an
irreversibly terminally ill patient—this question is not one for
judicial decision, but one for the attending physician, in keeping
with the highest traditions of his profession (18).”
Here we are 20 years later, grappling with the same
question. It is time to heed this court’s advice. Let us set in
motion the process by which patient’s best interests are duly
served.
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